Private Russian military companies are multiplying – and so are the Kremlin’s problems

The Kremlin has announced it may give legal status to some of the many private military companies (PMCs) active within Russia, notably the Wagner Group but also lesser-known militias like Convoy, Patriot, the Moran Security Group and Shchit (Shield).

“Legally, the Wagner private military group does not exist and has never existed,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters, noting that the status of companies such as Wagner remains “rather complicated”.

The declaration came a day after a similar statement made by Russian President Vladimir Putin to the “Kommersant” business daily. “The (Wagner) group is here, but it does not exist legally,” he said. Putin said its eventual legalisation was a question to be discussed in the Duma (the lower house) and within the government.

And yet the number of private military companies active in Russia has continued to grow in recent years, boosted by the necessity of drafting soldiers to fight the war in Ukraine as well as the Kremlin’s willingness to make these shadow armies an instrument of Russian foreign policy.

Weakened by sanctions and increasingly isolated on the international stage since its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia has been looking for a way to boost its geopolitical influence – particularly in Syria and on the African continent – notably through the Wagner Group.

The Blackwater model

Washington’s use of the Blackwater mercenary group in Iraq became an international symbol of the increasing privatisation of war. Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine, Yevgeny Prigozhin co-founded the Wagner paramilitary group, whose members were largely composed of former Special Forces and recruits from prisons. Once a close Putin ally, Prigozhin’s fate has been uncertain since a failed June 24 rebellion saw his men briefly march on Moscow.

Private military companies provide numerous advantages for the Russian state, including costing less than regular troops and the fact that, legally, they do not exist. This allows Moscow to wage hybrid warfare far afield, all the while denying involvement.

Russia’s military doctrine sought to focus on asymmetric responses to much more powerful enemies like NATO, said Danilo Delle Fave, an intelligence and military strategy analyst for the International Team for the Study of Security in Verona. “You can use mercenaries to do not only the dirty jobs but the high-risk ones that you don’t want to leave to your Special Forces.”

More than two dozen PMCs

Another advantage for the Kremlin is that mercenaries help mask the scale of Russian losses in Ukraine. Unconventional armed forces are rarely included in official casualty counts, thus reducing the political cost of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Russia has 27 active private military companies, with more than 70% created after 2014, according to Molfar, a Ukrainian investigative and fact-checking website.

Energy giant Gazprom recently created two private armies, known as Fakel (Torch) and Plamya (Flame). The mission of these private armies is to protect the company’s assets abroad but also to back up Russian forces in Ukraine. Since November of last year, even the Russian Orthodox Church finances its own PMC, whose volunteers were to take part in the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine.

“The number of PMCs could continue to grow, especially after the war in Ukraine ends,” said Marcel Plichta, a specialist in international relations at the University of St Andrews in the United Kingdom and a former analyst for the US Department of Defence. For the many Russians mobilised on the front lines, these private militias provide work opportunities and allow them to continue using the skills they learned on the job, he added.

According to a survey published by Molfar, about a quarter of Russian PMCs operate solely in Ukraine, while a dozen are present in several countries around the world, particularly in Africa. Their role is simple: to defend the interests of their leaders and those of the Kremlin. In the same vein, Wagner’s model consists of seizing natural resources in exchange for combat missions, military training and intelligence.

“Wagner is unique compared to other PMCs because Prigozhin is not just a mercenary boss, he is a businessman. In Africa he exploits gold mines through his companies, with his own employees and his own security service; he then exports minerals to other countries. There are no other militias with the same capabilities at the moment,” Plichta pointed out.

Not-so-private private militias

Far from being autonomous, Russian PMCs and their leaders maintain close ties with the Russian security apparatus and are subordinate to the Putin regime. The Wagner Group is particularly known for taking in former Russian military intelligence (GRU) officers.

Putin himself admitted to the links between the Russian state and Prigozhin’s men after its failed uprising. “From May 2022 to May 2023, the Russian state paid more than 86 billion roubles (approximately $940 million) to the Wagner Group,” the Russian president said.

The US Treasury in June 2022 slapped sanctions on one of the oldest and most important private security companies in Russia, the RSB-Group, which “provides global services for Russian companies in close coordination with the FSB”, Russia’s main federal security service.

Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu controls and finances several shadow armies and is affiliated with the Patriot paramilitary group. Sergei Aksyonov, the Russia-appointed head of the illegally annexed Crimea peninsula, has been playing warlord since the end of 2022 with Convoy, a private militia that has carried out several operations in the Kherson region of Ukraine.

Divide to conquer

“Elites have realised that having a PMC can get the benefits from the Kremlin. Because if you contribute to the war effort [in Ukraine], you will be rewarded,” said Anton Shekhovtsov, director of the Centre for Democratic Integrity, in an interview with Euronews.

According to Delle Fave, this “quasi-feudal” system serves to consolidate Putin’s power. The multiple power centres, all in competition with each other, prevents them from creating alliances and turning against him.

But Plichta said this fragmentation ultimately weakens the Kremlin, with the aborted Wagner rebellion revealing its fragility. “There has been a fragmentation of security missions in Russia: the Ministry of Defence, the PMCs, the National Guard which is almost Vladimir Putin’s personal security service. All this has led to the weakening of the state,” said Plichta.

In the wake of the Wagner rebellion, the Kremlin seems to feel the time has come for the state to regain control of its nebulous armed groups. Private military companies have been required to sign a contract with the defence ministry since July 1. Moscow released a video last month showing the Chechen paramilitary group Akhmat signing the contract to show how paramilitary groups were falling into line with the new law.

Wagner, for its part, is still experiencing the aftereffects of its short-lived insurrection last month. The Russian army announced on July 12 that it had received more than 2,000 pieces of military hardware from the group, adding that it had also taken in 2,500 tonnes of ammunition and around 20,000 small arms.

The Pentagon said on Friday that Wagner mercenaries are no longer participating in “any significant capacity” in combat operations in Ukraine.

This article has been translated from the original in French.