Are Jordan and Saudi Arabia defending Israel?

The 21 Arab and Muslim-majority countries made it clear where they stood in the Iran-Israel conflict.

In a statement published earlier this week, they expressed their “categorical rejection and condemnation of Israel’s recent attacks on the Islamic Republic of Iran,” which started on June 13. The countries spoke of the need to halt “Israeli hostilities against Iran” and expressed “great concern regarding this dangerous escalation, which threatens to have serious consequences on the peace and stability of the entire region.”

The signatories included both Jordan and Saudi Arabia. But their stated opposition to Israel’s attacks on Iran has not prevented them from intervening in the conflict, at least indirectly. Jordan, for example, has shot down missiles flying from Iran towards Israel. The Jordanian military confirmed they had done this in a statement, explaining that missiles and drones could have fallen onto Jordan, “including in populated areas, causing casualties.”

As with any other sovereign state, missiles or other unauthorized objects crossing a country’s airspace are often deemed violations of either domestic or international law.

The Saudi Arabians have not issued a similar statement, but experts say it’s likely they’ve allowed Israel to shoot missiles down in their airspace and may have cooperated on surveillance too.

Domestic politics in turmoil

But just as it has done in the recent past, this kind of military action could cause domestic tensions. Among the people of both nations, there is a historical antipathy towards Israel based on past wars and conflicts. That’s especially true for Jordan, where at least one in five locals, including the country’s queen, are of Palestinian descent.

It’s difficult for Jordan’s government to justify shooting down Iranian missiles headed for Israel, which is why the explanation of self-defense was given. “This message — ‘we are only defending ourselves’ — is being repeated on all channels,” says Edmund Ratka, head of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s office in Amman, Jordan.

Ratka says this is also due to the Jordanian political scene at the moment. In April, the country’s government banned the country’s largest political opposition movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, over connections to an alleged plot to destabilize the country.

“The [ban] seems carefully calibrated and intended to stem rising popular support for the [Muslim brotherhood] movement as the kingdom navigates a difficult regional backdrop,” Neil Quilliam, an associate fellow with British think tank Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa program, wrote at the time, as well as “undermine its growing appeal among a population incensed by Israel’s war in Gaza.”

This makes it all the more important for the Jordanian government to make sure that taking down Iranian missiles is not seen as solidarity with Israel, says Stefan Lukas, founder of the Germany-based consultancy, Middle East Minds. “Still, the decision [to do so] further escalates tensions,” he told DW.

There’s no way Jordan wants to be seen as defending Israel, Ratka confirms, “Because the Jordanian people largely perceive Israel as the aggressor.”

But, he adds, they feel the same about Iran, too. “We regularly conduct surveys in Jordan, and for years, they’ve shown there isn’t much sympathy for Iran in Jordan,” Ratka noted. “Because Iran is seen as a state that repeatedly interferes in Arab affairs with the intent to destabilize.”

Jordan also has other reasons for shooting down the Iranian missiles, Lukas says. Jordan can’t directly oppose the US, he says, referring to a 2021 defense cooperation agreement between the US and Jordan, which allows US forces, vehicles and aircraft to enter and move around Jordan freely. Jordan “is far too dependent on the US and, to some extent, on Israel too — both financially and in terms of security policy.”

It’s a difficult argument for the Jordanians to make. If they were that concerned about protecting domestic airspace, then the government would have to protest the presence of Israeli forces overhead, too.

As Ratka points out, though, Israel hasn’t violated Jordanian airspace with its attacks on Iran. “So the Jordanian leadership can, with some justification, claim it would combat any airspace violation,” he says. “Even if, in fact, it’s only fighting the Iranians.”

Saudi Arabia’s balancing act

Saudi Arabia is also in a tricky spot. It signed the same declaration as 20 other Arab and Muslim-majority countries did, and even before that, had referred to Iran as a “brotherly nation” in a statement condemning Israeli attacks on the nation of around 92 million.

The use of the word “brotherly” was seen as noteworthy by analysts because it’s usually reserved for fellow Arab-majority countries, whereas the Iranians are mostly Persians.

But beyond the official rhetoric, Saudi Arabia is pursuing a completely different course, Lukas says. “Unofficially, Saudi Arabia is participating in the action against Iran,” he confirms.

There’s security cooperation between the Saudis and Israelis, Lukas states. “Saudi Arabia provides radar data and tolerates [airspace] access by Israeli aircraft, especially in the northern part of the country where Iranian missiles primarily fly through. We’ve seen that Saudi Arabia is actually very accommodating to Israel.”

Saudi Arabia also depends heavily on the US for security, especially during years of antipathy toward Iran. Although the two nations recently reconciled, their relationship is still delicate. Saudi Arabia would likely turn to the US for protection when in doubt.