The founder and leader of Russia’s Wagner mercenary group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has been touted as someone who could pose a political challenge to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Once a key battlefield ally, in recent days Prigozhin has publicly lamented losing his direct line to the Kremlin. Wagner fighters are not being supplied with enough ammunition to win the battle for Bakhmut despite his numerous appeals, in what may be a sign of a struggle for influence in Moscow – and, notably, at Russia’s ministry of defence.
Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin had hoped seizing the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut would bring him a moment of glory but the Ukrainian city has been holding out against his Wagner Group mercenaries. Despite steady advances the city remains under Ukrainian control, according to a March 13 report from the Institute for the Study of War, a US think tank.
But that did not stop Prigozhin from declaring last week that he intends to run for president of Ukraine in 2024. And yet Prigozhin also seems all too aware that his political destiny is increasingly linked to the outcome of the battle.
“[Prigozhin] has been talking about the ‘liberation’ of Bakhmut since last July, and it’s still under Ukrainian control. I imagine some in Moscow must not be pleased with that,” says Stephen Hall, a specialist in Russian politics at the University of Bath.
It is not just Ukrainian soldiers who are thwarting Prigozhin’s political and military amibitions. In Moscow, an anti-Prigozhin camp has formed within the defence ministry, emboldened by Wagner’s difficulties on the battlefield, to disparage the man known as “Putin’s chef” – because he owns restaurants that cater to the Kremlin – who went on to become the king of Russian mercenaries.
Not one to obscure his motives, Prigozhin has previously flirted with the ideas of becoming defence minister or even creating his own political party.
Wagner vs the ministry of defence
Prigozhin has publicly complained of his treatment at the hands of the Russian ministry of defence (MoD). He has accused the ministry of blocking the ammunition deliveries his fighters need to take Bakhmut – and even called for the public to pressure the military to increase its supplies. In a March 9 post on his Telegram channel, he claimed that the government phone lines in Wagner units had been disabled after his public pleas for more ammunition.
The Wagner Group was viewed favourably after its success in helping Russia illegally annex Crimea in 2014 and for its actions in Syria and further afield, when the ministry of defence “provided ammunition and equipment to Wagner, and were rather pleased with the work done”, says Joseph Moses, a specialist in military strategy and the Ukraine war with the International Team for the Study of Security Verona.
Putin’s full-scale Ukraine invasion quickly changed the game. Putin sent the Wagner Group into combat once the regular army seemed to be struggling.
“Ukraine was fully mobilised, but Vladimir Putin was unwilling for political reasons to follow suit, only launching a partial mobilisation in September. His generals simply lacked the soldiers they needed,” writes Mark Galeotti, a specialist in Russian military affairs, in The Spectator, a British weekly. The mercenaries allowed the Kremlin to reinforce the front without launching a full-scale mobilisation.
These early successes may have gone to Prigozhin’s head. “He is very self-confident and has always been a bluffer. So he thought he could seize the opportunity [to gain political influence with Putin],” says Hall. It seems he intended to build upon the political wreckage left behind by Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and his right-hand man, Valery Gerasimov, the army chief of staff.
>>Read more: Shoigu and Gerasimov: Masters of Putin’s wars
“The whole Prigozhin versus MoD situation dates from around May, 2022,” just months after the February 2022 invasion, says Moses. “Prigozhin was then rumoured to be fueling the criticism ultranationalist bloggers were posting on Telegram and [other social media channels].”
“The competition for ammunition in Ukraine is the perfect theatre for infighting between Prigozhin and the MoD,” continues Moses. Ammunition is an increasingly rare commodity in what has now become a war of attrition, each side attempting to wear down its adversary’s resources over time.
For Prigozhin, it all hinges on Bakhmut
Bakhmut was supposed to validate Prigozhin’s military strategy, with him gambling on the idea that Ukraine would not marshal too many resources to defend a city with questionable strategic importance. “He expected Bakhmut to fall quickly,” Hall says.
The fighting has now been raging for more than nine months, and Prigozhin’s position is weakening.
“A coalition has formed against the threat posed by Prigozhin, and with the Bakhmut situation, they now have ammunition to try to weaken his role and influence Putin,” says Hall, who believes Wagner’s chief committed a strategic error by seeking to increase his influence.
“He may say that he had a direct line to the Kremlin, but in reality he never really had one,” Hall says. “He never was a close friend of Putin and some of his enemies, like Shoigu, have known Putin for much longer – and he tends to trust them more.”
The Russian defence ministry seems to have decided to make Bakhmut a tomb for Wagner mercenaries. “Prigozhin cannot give up on Bakhmut, so the regular army is using it to bleed Wagner dry, sending them into the worst fighting in the ruined AZOM metal works, while ready to swoop in and claim the victory as and when it falls,” writes Galeotti.
If Bakhmut remains under Ukrainian control, Wagner would have to shift the front to somewhere else very quickly if Prigozhin wants to return to the good graces of the Kremlin and keep his political ambitions alive, says Hall.
Prigozhin will also have to cede territory to other private military companies (PMCs), many more of which have emerged in recent months. “This would surely lead to a redistribution of roles between the different PMCs, with some, like Shoigu’s ‘Patriots’, gaining more influence,” says Moses.
The influence of private militias in Russia was underscored by the Duma’s adoption of a law this week making criticism of private paramilitary groups fighting in Ukraine punishable by lengthy jail terms.
But although Prigozhin’s image as a conquering hero has taken a hit, “he definitely still holds more credibility than the ministry of defence” with Putin, according to Moses. Most of the blame for the Russian army’s failures has been put on the ministry, Moses says.
What’s more, the Wagner Group is still very useful to the Kremlin. Wagner’s strategy in Bakhmut – to send in wave after wave of prisoners, recruited as fighters by Wagner in exchange for pardons – doesn’t affect the Kremlin as much as the death of Russia’s own soldiers, he points out.
If, in the end, Wagner mercenaries finally succeed in taking the city, “Prigozhin will be able to say that he achieved victory not only against Ukrainian [forces] but also despite the ministry of defence,” Moses says.
Viewed in this light, the battle for Bakhmut has become as much about Russia’s political future as the outcome of the war.
This article was translated from the original in French.
